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Advertising for Demographically Fair Outcomes
Lodewijk Gelauff∗ Ashish Goel† Kamesh Munagala‡ Sravya Yandamuri§
Abstract
Online advertising on platforms such as Google or Facebook has become an indispensable
outreach tool, including for applications where it is desirable to engage different demographics in
an equitable fashion, such as hiring, housing, civic processes, and public health outreach efforts.
Somewhat surprisingly, the existing online advertising ecosystem provides very little support for
advertising to (and recruiting) a demographically representative cohort.
We study the problem of advertising for demographic representativeness from both an
empirical and algorithmic perspective. In essence, we seek fairness in the outcome or conversions
generated by the advertising campaigns. We first present detailed empirical findings from
real-world experiments for recruiting for civic processes, using which we show that methods using
Facebook-inferred features are too inaccurate for achieving equity in outcomes, while targeting
via custom audiences based on a list of registered voters segmented on known attributes has
much superior accuracy.
This motivates us to consider the algorithmic question of optimally segmenting the list
of individuals with known attributes into a few custom campaigns and allocating budgets to
them so that we cost-effectively achieve outcome parity with the population on the maximum
possible number of demographics. Under the assumption that a platform can reasonably enforce
proportionality in spend across demographics, we present efficient exact and approximation
algorithms for this problem. We present simulation results on our datasets to show the efficacy
of these algorithms in achieving demographic parity.
1 Introduction
With the increased use of personalized ads, targeted advertising on platforms such as Google or
Facebook has become an increasingly powerful tool to perform online outreach to a population. In
this paper, we consider the broad problem of targeted advertising where we care about recruiting
a diverse cohort that represents a target demographic mix for the purpose of civic engagement.
At first blush, advertising for a representative cohort might seem like a simple problem that
should follow from the vast literature on ad targeting and the wide adoption of online advertising
platforms. However, the opaque nature of these platforms and the fact that they use complex
machine learning algorithms are major obstacles for a good faith advertiser that wants to reach or
engage a representative cohort In this paper, we use a field study to demonstrate why this problem
is challenging and motivate an algorithmic framework for achieving demographic fairness in the
outcome of advertising campaigns. Our approach is primarily advertiser-centric, in that we study
what an advertiser can do to target a demographically diverse mix. However, our work also provides
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insight into what an ad platform could do to make this problem feasible for the advertiser, without
sacrificing the ability of the platform to use tools like relevance estimation and differential pricing of
the same ad for different individuals.
Field Study Setup. In Section 2, we present the setup and results from running advertising
campaigns on Facebook for the Participatory Budgeting elections in the cities of Durham and
Greensboro in North Carolina. In Participatory Budgeting, there are a number of public projects
to choose from (such as new sidewalks, park renovations, etc.). Each project has a monetary cost,
and the city wants to select a set of projects given a total budget. Local community members vote
directly for their preferred projects, and these votes are aggregated to decide which projects to fund.
The election organizer often seeks votes from a diverse, representative cohort of residents.
The goal of the city in running these advertising campaigns was to make the demographic
mix along the dimensions of race and age comparable to that of the city. In other words, we seek
equitable outcome or equitable conversions: The proportion of the votes for various demographics
should be close to that of the overall adult population in the city. (In our experiments, we compile
the attributes of the demographics that voted by running surveys on the votes generated by these
campaigns.) We use the experiments to study feasible approaches and develop an algorithmic
framework. Subsequently, we simulate this framework on our data to show its efficacy for achieving
demographic parity.
Achieving High Targeting Accuracy. We show that a pre-requisite for achieving demographic
parity is an accurate way of targeting various demographic sub-types in the population. If there
were a set of campaigns that accurately target different demographics, then we can hope to allocate
budgets appropriately to these campaigns to make the number of conversions proportional to
the respective targeted demographic. If on the other hand, a campaign targeted at a minority
demographic leads to disproportionately many conversions from the majority demographic, then
even with unlimited money assigned to this campaign, the outcome cannot be equitable.
Indeed, in Section 3, we empirically demonstrate that Facebook’s targeting methods based
on multicultural affinity to ethnicity and race, or self-reported education levels have uniformly
low accuracy and are not sufficient for achieving demographic parity. Even more surprisingly, we
discovered that targeting a demographic minority can actually result in fewer individuals from that
demographic being recruited per dollar spent compared to a wider campaign (Section 3.1)!
We show a way forward to achieve high accuracy in demographic outcomes by using an approach
discussed in [4]. We created a set of custom audiences, using the list of registered voters in the city,
along with their (self-)identified race, age, and gender. We create campaigns where we explicitly
target these voters, and show that this approach is superior in that it yields high specificity for
targeting African Americans and voters by age groups. It also enables us to perform a more
fine-grained study of the advertising process, and thereby work towards achieving outcome fairness.
Balancing Fine-grained Demographics Cost-effectively. If we seek to approximate a random
sample of the population, we need to simultaneously achieve demographic parity on combinations of
several attributes (say race, age, gender, education). Given that campaigns constructed from voter
lists have sufficiently large targeting accuracy, in Section 4, we turn to the question of achieving
demographic parity for every combination of attributes (fine-grained demographics) cost-effectively
via constructing suitably targeted campaigns. One could do this by constructing a separate custom
campaign for each fine-grained demographic by using its voter list. We present arguments backed
by our experiments for why this is undesirable from both privacy and cost standpoints, and why
fewer campaigns with larger audiences are more cost-effective.
This motivates the algorithmic problem of segmenting the voter list into a few disjoint campaigns
and allocate budgets to them so that we achieve demographic parity in outcome for as many fine
2
grained demographics as possible. In order to make this problem tractable, we assume the platform’s
allocation mechanisms are such that we can find per-demographic weights such that the spend of a
campaign is split in proportion to these weights among the sub-demographics within the campaign.
We argue that proportionality is an easily implementable contract between platform and advertiser.
Indeed, the commonly used budget smoothing mechanism of probabilistic pacing [1, 6], which uses the
probability that an ad can compete for an auction to limit the amount of spending by a campaign,
implements proportionality in the large market regime. More details are in Section 4.1.
Under the proportionality assumption, in Sections 4.3 and 4.4, we develop efficient exact and
approximation algorithms via dynamic programming for several natural objective functions related
to achieving demographic parity in outcomes. Our technique involves an interesting transformation
of the problem to eliminate the non-linearity arising due to the presence of proportions in the
objective. In Section 4.5, we present heuristics for implementing these algorithms online.
It is important to note that the proportionality assumption does not require the platform to
assign identical relevance weights or charge identical prices for all demographics (or all individuals
in the same demographic). In fact, the platform can set arbitrary prices for different individuals,
and arbitrarily exclude individuals from seeing an ad, and still satisfy proportionality, provided that
it uses probabilistic pacing and the relevance score/filtering criteria for an individual and an ad
depend only on the characteristics of the individual and the ad, and not on which targeting criteria
were used.
Finally, in Section 4.6, we run the optimization algorithm on our data (after inferring conversion
rates for the demographics), and it provides an upper bound on how well we could have balanced
on attribute combinations (such as race, age, and gender) if such balancing was our sole objective
as opposed to the experiments presented above. We compute such an empirical upper bound, and
show that it is indeed possible to achieve approximately fine-grained parity on most race-age-gender
combinations with modest cost per vote, and reasonably large audience size per campaign.
Summary. In summary, our work can be viewed as both a positive as well as a negative result. On
the positive side, it demonstrates the power of advertising to curated lists of potential participants,
and leads to principled optimization approaches which only require minor (if any) modifications to
the ML routines used by the platform for targeting and pricing. On the negative side, it shows that
when such lists are not available, it is not possible to treat the platform’s behavior as a black box,
and we would need to re-engineer these systems to take demographic diversity into account.
It is important to note that while we point out several deficiencies in Facebook’s ad platform
for our specific problem, the advertising eco-system is complex, and it would not be appropriate to
ascribe any wrong-doing to Facebook on the basis of our work. For example, it is entirely conceivable
that Facebook imposes an extra surcharge for targeting small populations or racial characteristics
to avoid privacy-loss and exploitation of vulnerable segments of society.
We finally note that though we have used Participatory Budgeting elections as the main
application domain to explore the problem of advertising to diverse cohorts, our techniques and
insights may be applicable more broadly in contexts where it is desirable to perform outreach to
various demographics in an equitable fashion, for instance, in hiring, housing, and public health
outreach efforts.
Roadmap. We describe our experimental setup in Section 2, and present our results for targeting in
Section 3. Section 4 presents the algorithmic formulation of the problem of constructing campaigns
and budgets for fine-grained demographic balance, the rationale for the formulation, efficient
algorithms, and an empirical evaluation on our dataset. Section 5 provides a list of open problems,
including a discussion of normative and ethical concerns.
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1.1 Related Work
Online advertising. Online advertising – including the problems of targeting, allocation, auc-
tioning, and pricing – has been widely studied in the context of maximizing the expected return
which can be measured as either impressions, clicks, or conversions (i.e. when the user takes the
desired action such as purchase a product or complete a survey). The literature is too vast to
cite here, but there has been significant work in auction design [3, 15, 28, 5], online allocations
in advertising [12, 13, 26], and design of advertising exchanges [7, 17]. At a high level, in the
former, the platform performs dynamic allocations of ads to publishers given long-term budgets
for advertisers, while in the latter, the platform acts as an intermediary given reservation prices
from publishers and bids from advertisers, both of which are dynamic. However, the problem of
dynamically selecting a representative cohort that actually converts has not been studied in either
of these settings.
Fair Advertising. There has been very recent work that addresses the problem of demographic
parity from the platform’s perspective. For instance, the work of [10] considers the problem of
auction design taking into account demographic constraints, and the work of [29] considers the
problem of dynamically adjusting the bid of an advertiser via an MDP formulation to achieve parity
among fixed categories (such as number of male versus female impressions). While these works
consider the problem from the platform’s perspective and hence focus on equity in allocation of
budgets or impressions, we focus on equity in outcomes, which is the natural next step given a
platform can reasonably balance budgets or impressions. This leads to interesting algorithmic as
well as empirical insights that are different from previous work.
A high level challenge with advertising for equitable outcomes is that platforms don’t always
expose a full range of demographic targeting filters for various legal and ethical reasons – a tool
that can be used for promoting diversity by allowing an advertiser to reach specific audiences can
also be used for discriminating against protected groups. In some contexts such as housing or
lending, such discrimination is explicitly prohibited by law. Further, the recent work of [4, 16]
shows that Facebook’s existing ad targeting mechanisms can lead to unfair outcomes because
they rely on complex machine learning models and among other things, they point out the role
of complex machine learning models that cause ads indistinguishable to humans to effectively
target very different demographic groups. In contrast, our goal is less about understanding why
disparate targeting or conversions occur, but rather about how their effects can be mitigated from
the advertiser’s perspective.
Fairness in Automated Decision Making. . Fairness is a nuanced topic, and our experiments
view it as demographic parity (equity of outcomes). Recent work [14, 11] has discussed a range of
fairness conditions for automated decision making, and show that how even when an individual
decision can seem fair, it may have an unfair effect when multiple algorithms and decisions collide.
In particular, this work distinguishes between individual (equal characteristics = equal probabilities)
and group-fairness (demographic groups get similar treatments). Some preliminary progress has
recently been made in incorporating notions of individual fairness into advertising models [22],
but incorporating these notions into our advertiser-centric approach remains an interesting open
direction. The trade-off between fairness and efficiency has been extensively studied in classification
(see for instance [33]) and our work performs a similar analysis in the context of advertising.
Team formation. A different line of work that we draw inspiration from is the formation of
diverse teams [25, 23, 24, 31, 32]. In these problems, we are given a set of people with skills in
different dimensions, and the goal is to choose one team or multiple teams, where each skill is
represented. Such models have applications in the design of crowd sourcing platforms. A stylized
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view of our problem is as team formation where we view each set of advertising campaigns as a
team that yields a demographic mix. Though creating such campaigns is superficially related to
diverse team formation, the crucial difference is that our objective is not utility-maximization, but
instead balancing the demographic mix that is obtained as a result of the campaigns.
Collective Decision Making. There has been a recent resurgence in the field of social choice, the
science of making collective decisions. Some practical examples are Participatory Budgeting [30],
the MIT moral machine [27], sortition [8], and delegative democracy [19]. Our premise in this paper
is that for such decision making processes to work effectively, it is important to recruit participants
that are representative of the underlying population.
We note that the problem we study is quite different from that of running opinion polls, where
one can re-weight the results of the poll to correct for any demographic disparity in participation [18];
this cannot be done in civic processes due to ethical constraints.
2 Experimental Setup with Participatory Budgeting Elections
We now describe our experimental setup and results for advertising for a demographic mix in
the context of the Participatory Budgeting elections in Durham and Greensboro, North Carolina.
We show example ads in Fig 1.
Figure 1: Example Participatory Budgeting Facebook ads in Durham (left) and Greensboro (right).
Each advertising campaign on Facebook specifies an ad creative, an audience, a budget and a
bidding strategy. For each city, we created a set of parallel campaigns with an identical ad creative
that invites city residents to vote in the Participatory Budgeting election that was organized by
the city. Each ad campaign is targeted to a specific demographic via a targeting criterion; we
preset details of these campaigns and criteria in Appendix A. The bidding strategy is always set to
optimize for number of clicks, as recommended by Facebook. If a user clicks on the ad, they are
taken to the election landing page where they can choose their district, register, and vote. If a voter
completes the voting process, they are then prompted to complete a satisfaction and demographic
survey. A parameter in the URL tracks which campaign they arrived through, which allows us to
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establish the demographic characteristics of residents that arrived through each of the campaigns
and completed the survey.
We use equitable outcome (proportionate completion of surveys across demographics) as our
desired objective because a proportionate ballot completion across demographics is what makes the
process most representative for the city population. We see a high survey completion rate of 75% or
higher across demographics.
Our end-goal is to develop a framework for constructing a set of campaigns targeted at various
demographic segments and allocate budgets between them so that the resulting conversions are
proportional to the size of those demographics. Since the goals of achieving equity of outcome and
performing experiments to unearth feasible approaches to doing it conflict with each other, we focus
on the latter goal in our experiments. In Section 4.6, we simulate the algorithmic framework derived
from the experiments on our data to show how equity of outcomes could have been achieved had it
been our primary goal.
3 Achieving High Targeting Accuracy
In this section, we present experiments that compare different targeting schemes in terms of
their effectiveness in targeting the relevant demographics. We do so by measuring specificity of the
corresponding campaign, defined as follows.
Definition 1. Let αi denote the fraction of demographic i in the population. The specificity of a
campaign j for demographic i, denoted βij is fraction of outcomes of that campaign that were from
demographic i. We say the specificity is “high” if βij ≥ αi and “low” otherwise.
High specificity is a pre-requisite for equity as shown by the following straightforward lemma.
Lemma 1. Given a set S of campaigns and demographic i, if we have low specificity, βij < αi for
all j ∈ S, then the proportion of outcome generated for demographic i by any budget allocation to S
is less than αi, so that we cannot achieve equitable outcomes.
For instance, if any campaign, including that targeted at African Americans, only leads to at
most 20% conversions from African Americans, while they represent 40% of the population, we
cannot hope to achieve demographic parity since in any budget allocation, at most 20% of the
conversions will be African American. We therefore need specificity of a targeted campaign to
be at least the proportion of that demographic in the population. However, the “high specificity”
threshold of αi is necessary but need not be sufficient to construct campaigns to achieve demographic
parity, since we need to achieve parity across several demographics simultaneously. Ideally we would
like specificity of a targeted campaign to be close to 1. Surprisingly, we show that several targeting
approaches fail even the baseline “high specificity” threshold.
3.1 Facebook-inferred Targeting: Low Specificity and Pareto Sub-Optimality
As described in detail in Appendix A.1, we started in Durham by naively targeting through
Facebook-inferred characteristics related to race and ethnicity. For the African American campaign,
the campaign was targeted towards those in Durham with an interest in African American culture
and behavior identified as African American multi-cultural affinity (AfrAm1); similarly for Hispanic
culture and affinity (Hisp1). In addition we ran one campaign excluding everyone with any college
experience (Educ), and one campaign targeted to the general population (General).
In Table 1, we show the specificity of the (Educ), (AfrAm1) and (Hisp1) campaigns for that
respective demographic in the second, third, and fourth columns. We observed low specificity
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from the Facebook targeted campaigns for race and education level. Note that the specificity
for the African American campaign (AfrAm1) is 20%, compared to the proportion of 37% in the
population. The specificity is so low that the best solution to obtain a race-equitable outcome,
allocating the entire budget to the (AfrAm1) campaign, had a detrimental effect on the overall vote
proportions, which meant it is not possible to achieve demographic parity for African Americans via
such campaigns. In fact, the organic efforts of the City of Durham achieved a better proportion of
African Americans. Note that though the specificity of the (AfrAm1) campaign was poor, it was
more specific than the (General) campaign with respect to this demographic, showing that just
using the (General) campaign would not have achieved parity. We summarize our observation as:
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Population Fraction α 0.13 0.37 0.14 0.37 0.37 0.55 0.30 0.15 0.41
Achieved Specificity β 0.12 0.21 0.12 0.21 0.69 1.0 0.93 0.91 0.70
95% CI Lower bound 0.06 0.16 0.05 0.08 0.57 0.93 0.82 0.76 0.6
95% CI Upper bound 0.2 0.27 0.22 0.39 0.79 1 0.98 0.99 0.81
Table 1: Specificity of targeted ad campaigns. α is the fraction of the targeted demographic in
the population, β is the mean specificity for that demographic via the campaign, and the 95% CI
assumes the counts follow a Binomial distribution. The high specificity voter-list based custom
campaigns (β ≥ α) are in blue and the low specificity campaigns (β < α) are in red.
Observation 1. The specificity of the African American campaigns is low when we target by
Facebook-inferred criteria such as multi-cultural affinity or interest in culture. The specificity of
Facebook-inferred Education criteria is also low
Pareto non-optimality of Targeting. In addition to having low specificity, these targeted
campaigns may not be cost-effective even for the demographic they are targeting. The first three
columns of Fig 2a show the cumulative African American votes per dollar for two of the Durham
2019 campaigns. We make a surprising observation:
Observation 2. The General campaign (General) has a higher rate of African American votes per
dollar than the African American culture/multi-cultural affinity campaigns (AfrAm1 and AfrAm2).
3.2 Targeting via Voter List-based Custom Audiences: High Specificity
The low specificity and high cost of the Facebook-inferred targeting criteria led us to targeting
with custom audiences created from the North Carolina list of registered voters. In order to specify a
custom audience, we take the publicly available voter registration database of North Carolina, filter
for the desired characteristics and upload a list of people with personally identifiable information.
Facebook matches a set of profiles to the list, which then becomes the audience for that campaign.
The sixth column of Table 1 contains the specificity for African Americans of the custom
campaign (AfrAmC) in Durham NC created with the list of African American voters. This has high
specificity β = 70%, relative to their α = 37%. Similarly, in Fig 2a, this campaign has high votes
per dollar and Pareto-dominates the (General) campaign. To validate this conclusion further, in the
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(a) Number of African American votes achieved
per dollar spent on the various campaigns in
Durham. Note that the targeted (AfrAm1) cam-
paign is worse for this demographic than (General).
(b) Votes of respective demographic per dollar
spent on entire campaign for Greensboro 2019 Cus-
tom Audience and complement Campaigns. For
the “complement” campaign, we consider all its
votes.
Figure 2: The vertical bar shows 95% CI around the mean (solid dot) assuming a Poisson process.
next experiment in Greensboro (Appendix A.2), we used 5 custom campaigns created using voter
lists along two demographic axes: age – (YoungC) aged 18-44, (MiddleC) aged 45-64, and (OldC)
aged 65 and up; and whether someone was African American (AfrAmC) or not (OtherC). A sixth
“complement” campaign, (Complement1), was created targeting the whole city except those people
part of any of the other voter-list based campaigns, in order not to fully exclude anyone from the
advertising process. The final four columns of Table 1 shows the high specificity of the Greensboro
age and race custom campaigns for the respective demographic, which validates the conclusion from
Durham and is summarized below.
Observation 3. Campaigns that create custom audiences using known lists of people within a
demographic have high specificity for age and race criteria.
3.3 Other Experimental Results
We present other experimental results in Appendix B. These are relevant to the model developed
in the next section. We describe two that pertain to specificity and cost next.
Lookalike Campaigns have Low Specificity. In an attempt to also efficiently target people
that were not registered voters, we then created campaigns with ”lookalike” audiences based on
the respective filtered voter lists; these campaigns targeted users that Facebook thinks look like
the voters in our custom audience. These campaigns are described in detail in Appendix A. The
lookalike campaign based on the African American voter list in Durham (AfrAmLAL) resulted in
poor specificity (see fifth column in Table 1) and low votes per dollar (Fig 2a). We present results
for lookalike campaigns in Greensboro NC in Appendix B.2 showing the poor specificity of this
feature even along the dimensions of age and gender.
Conversion Rates. Though the voter list campaigns are highly specific, they can have large
variation in conversion rates that we show in Fig 2b. Note that the conversion rates between the
(AfrAmC) and the (OtherC) campaign differ by a factor of more than six.
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4 Campaign Design for Fine-Grained Demographic Balancing
The previous section showed that campaigns based on targeting lists of individuals have high
enough specificity so that they can used in our application of demographic parity. Given this ability
to accurately target demographics, we now study the question of how to construct cost-effective
campaigns that can simultaneously achieve equality of outcome on fine-grained demographics such
as all possible (race, age, gender) combinations. We formulate this as an optimization problem with
constraints and assumptions that we motivate next.
4.1 Modeling and Assumptions
Formally, we are given a set D of n demographics, where demographic i comprises a fraction
αi ∈ [0, 1] of the population. We assume these are disjoint, so that
∑
i αi = 1. These demographics
could be all possible combinations of race, age, and gender. For demographic i ∈ D, let φi denote the
number of conversions per dollar for this demographic, had we constructed a campaign targeting the
voter list restricted to this demographic. A daily budget of B can be split between the campaigns.
Number of Campaigns. First note that we cannot simply construct one campaign with the entire
voter list. Even in the ideal case that the platform partitions the budget equitably, as mentioned
before, different demographics can have large variation in conversion rates φi that we show in Fig 2b.
We could go the other extreme and create one custom campaign for each of the n demographics,
assigning budgets to them achieve parity in conversions. However, this will lead to too many
campaigns each of which is constructed using a small voter list and small budget. This approach
can lead to too few matches with Facebook’s population, thereby violating privacy of individual
users. In Appendix B.3, we present experimental evidence that splitting the voter list of a campaign
into smaller parts with proportionally lower budget has higher cost per conversion and higher
variance in this value compared to larger campaign, making the smaller campaigns much more
expensive and harder to learn parameters of. This effect is likely by design – smooth delivery
algorithms [9, 2] can cause high variance effects for small budgets; further, the platform can
conceivably put a premium on small campaigns to penalize discriminatory behavior.
To make the campaigns cost-effective and privacy preserving, we therefore enforce a constraint k
on the total number of campaigns we can create. Continuing our formalism, our goal is to partition
the n demographics into k disjoint campaigns, each targeting the relevant subset of the demographics
(in our case, via targeting their voter list). A campaign j is represented as a tuple (Bj , Sj), where
Bj is the campaign’s daily budget and Sj ⊆ D is the subset of demographics targeted by that
campaign. Note that
∑
j Bj ≤ B. We assume the Sj are disjoint and ∪jSj ⊆ D. This allows for
the possibility of omitting some demographics from the campaigns.
Proportionality Assumption. If a campaign spans more than one demographic, we need an
assumption on how the budget of the campaign is split among the constituent demographics in
order to make the algorithm design and parameter learning tractable. Towards this end, we make a
proportionality assumption: Given a campaign j with demographics Sj , we assume its budget is
allocated to demographic i ∈ Sj in proportion to a known parameter, qi, that depends only on this
demographic and not on the other demographics in set Sj . Under this assumption, the expected
number of votes per dollar for demographic i ∈ Sj (that is, the conversion rate) is therefore:
ηij = φi
qi∑
`∈Sj q`
(1)
We now argue that proportionality is a simple and easily implementable contract between the
platform and the advertiser. If the platform uses probabilistic pacing [1] to smooth the daily budget
9
B, we can idealize its behavior as follows. Suppose with infinite campaign budget, an individual’s
pricing and relevance estimation for the ad does not depend on which other demographics are in
the campaign. In this infinite budget case, let qi be the money that would have been spent on
demographic i. Further suppose the audience of the campaign arrives in random order uniformly
over time. Then the total spend on campaign j in the infinite budget setting is Bˆ =
∑
`∈Sj q`. Under
probabilistic pacing, the platform considers each impression independently with probability B/Bˆ.
Clearly, the expected number of conversions for any subset of impressions is proportional, so that
those for demographic i will be qiB/Bˆ, hence showing proportionality. Note that proportionality
is more general than the assumption that spend should be proportional to audience size since
the corresponding demographics could have very different pricing characteristics. Indeed, this
assumption allows the platform considerable latitude in developing relevance and pricing criteria,
and hence can be thought of as a ”minimal contract” between an ad platform and an advertiser.
4.2 Objective Function
Under the proportionality assumption (Eq (1), we seek to construct at most k disjoint campaigns
and allocate budgets to them, so that the total budget is at most the daily budget B. Suppose
in the outcome, the fraction of conversions for demographic i is ρiαi for ρi ≥ 0. We optimize an
objective function of the form
∑
i∈D f(ρi) corresponding to demographic parity.
We consider the γ-step function objective where we fix a parameter γ ∈ [0, 1], and define
f(ρi) = 1 if ρi ≥ γ and 0 otherwise. This corresponds to maximizing the number of demographics
whose representation in the votes is at least a γ factor of their representation in the population.
Mathematical Program. Since we are interested in proportions in outcomes, we can phrase the
problem somewhat differently. Our goal is to construct at most k disjoint campaigns and allocate
budgets bj to them, where bj denotes the campaign budget scaled down by the overall number of
conversions. Recall the definition of ηij from the proportionality assumption, Eq (1). Suppose the
fraction of conversions (votes) for demographic i is ρiαi for ρi ≥ 0. We want: (i) to enforce the
constraint that the expected number of conversions is exactly one:∑
i∈D
ρiαi =
∑
j=1,2,...,k
∑
i∈Sj
bjηij = 1
and (ii) to optimize an objective function corresponding to demographic parity in conversions:
Maximize
∑
i∈D
f(ρi) (2)
The bj values above are the budgets needed to generate one vote in expectation. Given a daily
budget B, we will simply allocate it to the campaigns in proportion to the bj values, in other words,
the daily budget of campaign j is Bj =
bj∑
j′ bj′
B. This preserves the ratios ρi for all i ∈ D.
In the integer non-linear program below, ` denote campaigns. xi` is the indicator variable
whether demographic i successfully achieves its γαi share from campaign `, and b` is as defined
above. The objective captures the number of successful demographics. The first constraint captures
that each successful demographic was assigned to at most one campaign; the second constraint,
when xi` = 1 says that parity was achieved for demographic i; and the third constraint encodes that
{b`} generate one vote overall.
Maximize
∑
i∈D
k∑
`=1
xi`
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∑k
`=1 xi` ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ D
b` (φiqi) /
(∑
j∈D qjxj`
)
≥ γ · αixi` ∀i ∈ D, ` = 1, 2, . . . , k∑k
`=1 b`
((∑
i∈D φiqixi`
)
/
(∑
i∈D qixi`
))
= 1
xi` ∈ {0, 1} and b` ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ D, ` = 1, 2, . . . , k
4.3 Efficient Algorithm
Despite the non-linearity in the above formulation, our main algorithmic contribution is the
following surprising theorem.
Theorem 2. The joint campaign design and budget allocation problem assuming a γ-step function
objective can be exactly solved in O(kn5) time by dynamic programming.
The proof first involves a non-trivial change of variables to eliminate the non-linearity. We
subsequently show that the problem is amenable to dynamic programming.
Transformed Formulation. We first use Eq (1) to transform the problem and get rid of the
ratios in ηij , so that it is amenable to efficient computation. We set
wi = qiφi; Yj =
bj∑
`∈Sj q`
; βi =
αi
qiφi
where φi and qi are the conversion rates and spend proportionality factors respectively for demo-
graphic i.
Let σ(i) = j if i ∈ Sj . Then, the number of conversions for demographic i ∈ Sj is
ρiαi = bjηij = Yσ(i)wi =⇒ ρi =
Yσ(i)
βi
.
Therefore, the input is (wi, βi) for each demographic, and the output, for each campaign, is the
number Yj and set of demographics Sj . The constraint of one vote in expectation becomes∑
j
Yj
∑
i∈Sj
wi = 1 (3)
Given the output Yj and Sj , we can calculate bj as bj = Yj
∑
`∈Sj q`. The tuple (Sj , Yj) therefore
completely describes campaign j. In order to capture demographics not assigned to any campaign,
we create a dummy campaign with b0 = Y0 = 0, and S0 as the set of demographics assigned to it.
Therefore, if σ(i) = 0, demographic i is not assigned to any campaign.
With the above transformation, Objective (2) becomes:
Maximize
∑
i∈D
f
(
Yσ(i)
βi
)
For the γ-step and monotone objectives described above, since f is monotonically non-decreasing,
we can replace Constraint (3) with the constraint that there is at most one vote in expectation; any
solution satisfying the latter constraint can be converted to satisfy the former constraint by scaling
up the Yj ’s, while not decreasing the objective. Therefore, for monotone functions, the following
constraint suffices: ∑
j
Yj
∑
i∈Sj
wi ≤ 1 (4)
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Dynamic Programming. Recall that for parameter γ, f(x) = 1 if x ≥ γ, and 0 otherwise. Let
βˆi = γβi. Then the objective is:
Maximize
∑
i∈D
1Yσ(i)≥βˆi
Given any setting of Y1 ≤ Y2 ≤ · · · ≤ Yk, let θi = argminj{Yj ≥ βˆi}. Note that if i ∈ D is
assigned to a campaign (and hence contributes to the objective), it must be assigned to a campaign
with Yj ≥ βˆi. Regardless of which campaign it is assigned to, the contribution to the objective
is 1; however, assigning to a campaign with smaller Yj only makes Constraint (4) more feasible.
Therefore, we have the following claim:
Claim 1. If i ∈ D is assigned to a campaign (and hence contributes to the objective), it must be
assigned to campaign θi, that is, σ(i) = θi.
Therefore, if we sort βˆi in increasing order (and number them as 1, 2, . . . in that order), each
optimal Yj will correspond to one of these values, and all i whose βˆi lie between Yj−1 and Yj will
either lie in Sj or not be assigned to any campaign.
Given the above observation, let Vj(i,m) denote the best set of j campaigns, where Yj = βˆi, that
satisfy at least m of the first i demographics and that minimizes the expected number of conversions.
The final goal is find the maximum m so that minni=1 Vj(i,m) ≤ 1.
For j > 1, we have the recurrence:
Vj(i,m) = max
1≤`<i,m′≤m
{
Vj−1(`,m−m′) +K(`, i,m′)
}
For j = 1, we have V1(i,m) = K(1, i,m). Here, K(`, i,m) is the minimum expected number of
conversions needed to satisfy at least m of the demographics {`+ 1, . . . , i} by assigning to a single
campaign with Y = βˆi. In other words, K(`, i,m) is the solution to a Knapsack problem. Here,
item i having unit profit and size wcβˆi. The goal is to find the smallest knapsack size to achieve
profit at least m. This can be exactly solved in O(n2) time by dynamic programming and implies
Theorem 2.
4.4 Other Objectives
The basic framework described above extends to more general objective functions f(ρ). We
consider two general functions f that we motivate next.
Monotone functions. The γ-step function does not give any credit to demographics that are
even slightly less satisfied than γαi. We can generalize this to smoother functions that penalizes
demographics whose fraction in the conversions is less than the fraction in the population, but there
is no penalty for a demographic being over-represented. In other words, for monotone functions, we
have f(ρi) is monotonically non-decreasing for ρi ∈ [0, 1] with f(0) = 0 and f(ρi) = 1 if ρi ≥ 1. This
not only generalizes γ-step functions, but also captures functions of the form f(ρi) = min(1, ρi/γ),
which linearly penalizes if the fraction of voters deviates below γαi, and does not penalize if the
fraction exceeds this amount. In Appendix C.1, we present a 2-approximation algorithm for arbitrary
monotone functions.
Variation Distance. The objective functions described above give equal importance to satisfy-
ing small demographics (small α) and large ones (large α), since the objective normalizes each
demographics’ vote fraction by α. We could alternatively consider an objective that minimizes
the variation distance between the population fractions {αi} and the vote fractions {ρiαi}, so that
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f(ρi) = −αi |1− ρi|. Such a global approach may ignore small demographics if there are a few of
them, which has the advantage of potentially reducing the cost per vote. In Appendix C.2, we
present an approximation for the variation distance objective.
4.5 Parameter Learning
In developing the model and algorithms, we assume that for each demographic i, the conversion
rate φi and the proportionality in spend qi values are known. In practice, we will have to learn
these values. If the platform performs probabilistic pacing, it can reveal the scaling factor
∑
i∈Sj qi
for each campaign j. If we split the n demographics in a different fashion into the k campaigns
over n/k days, then we get n linearly independent equations, from which we can infer the n values
qi. We can now use the number of conversions ηij per dollar spent on the campaign to infer the
conversion rates φi via Eq (1). We leave designing bandit algorithms to learn these parameters with
low regret, or using estimates from another city as prior, as a future research direction.
4.6 Simulation on Greensboro, NC Data
We simulated our algorithms using data from the Greensboro 2019 Participatory Budgeting
Election and the North Carolina voter list to show that had the primary goal of our experiment
been to achieve demographic balance, we could have achieved it via suitable campaign design and
budget allocation.
We considered the the γ-step function objective presented above. The set of demographics
D is defined with three dimensions: African American and non-African American race; young,
middle, and older ages; and male and female gender. A demographic i ∈ D is a race-age-gender
combination so that |D| = 12. We set proportionality values qi to the voter list sizes for the
corresponding demographics. In Appendix B.4, we present experimental evidence that Facebook’s
allocation mechanism approximately satisfies proportionality for this setting of qi, showing it is a
reasonable approximation to make in our simulation. The conversion rates φi were inferred from the
custom campaigns (AfrAmC) and (OtherC) (Appendix A.2) targeted toward African Americans
and non-African-Americans respectively. Using the amount of money spent for each age-gender
combination reported by Facebook, if vi is the number of surveys obtained and bi is the spend by
demographic i from the corresponding campaign, then we set the conversion rate φi =
max(1,vi)
bi
.
γ=0.5 0.7 0.9 1.0
Count 11 10 9 9
CPV $23.73 $32.07 $39.30 $43.67
Size ratio 0.438 0.336 0.202 0.202
(a) k = 2 Campaigns
γ=0.5 0.7 0.9 1.0
12 12 11 11
$22.47 $25.09 $30.62 $34.02
0.068 0.076 0.076 0.076
(b) k = 4 Campaigns
Table 2: Count is the number of demographics satisfied; CPV is the combined budget of the k
campaigns to achieve one vote; and size ratio is the ratio of the size of the smallest voter list over
all campaigns to that of the total voter list.
Results. In Table 2, we present the results of simulating our algorithm for two different values of
k, and various settings of γ. We show that a small number, k = 4, of campaigns suffice to satisfy 11
out of the 12 demographics exactly, or all 12 demographics to γ ≥ 70% of their fair proportions. As
expected, the results show an increased CPV for increasing values of γ, and increasing the number
of campaigns results in smaller campaigns. However, the final row in the table also shows that
bounding the number of campaigns is a reasonable approximation to ensuring large audiences.
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We emphasize that this is only a proof of concept simulation. We used fixed settings of {qi, φi},
where the former is an approximation and the latter learnt from data. Had we run the resulting
campaigns on Facebook, we could use the following heuristic to periodically adjust campaigns
and budgets: Fix qi to be equal to voter list size. Periodically recalculate the φi based on actual
conversions ηij via Eq (1), recompute the optimal campaigns and budgets using Theorem 2, and
update them accordingly.
5 Discussion and Open Questions
Our work suggests several directions for future research. We divide these into four categories.
The Platform Perspective. We addressed the problem of achieving demographically balanced
outcomes from the advertiser’s perspective. A natural question that arises is why not put all the
onus on the platform? An obvious answer is that not all advertisers care about such equity at the
expense of overall ROI, and further, we use equity in outcome that a platform cannot reasonably
measure. A more nuanced answer is that it is not clear if platforms should even provide explicit
support for advertising to a diverse cohort, since a tool for cost-effectively allowing an advertiser to
reach specific audiences can also be used for discriminating against protected groups and privacy-loss.
It is an interesting open question to study additional tools a platform can provide to enable fairness,
and the security and privacy implications of such tools.
The Advertiser Perspective. While voter lists can be a part of the solution for recruiting a
diverse cohort, they can exclude certain segments of society, particularly, individuals who have
not voted in the past. Hence, it would be desirable to develop additional mechanisms for reliably
reaching a target demographic. We did not find “lookalike targeting” on Facebook based on race to
be very effective for this purpose, as we detailed in Appendix B.2. Similarly, we also allocated a
minimum portion of our budget to a complementary campaign; however, this again negates much of
the effect of creating a balanced cohort.
It would also be interesting to explore using a combination of online advertising and social
seeding (e.g. [34]). While social influence maximization has been well studied (e.g. [21]), the focus
has not been on getting a diverse cohort. Further, an advertiser-centric approach can allow the
advertiser to use multiple platforms to achieve the desired diversity when different platforms are
more cost-effective or have a bigger reach for different demographics. For instance, the City of
Greensboro independently also advertised on Instagram and through YouTube with two targeted
campaigns based on household income being over and under the city median. This resulted in a
more specific campaign for African Americans than the campaigns in Section 3.1, but less effective
(high cost per vote). Similarly, it would be interesting to check how generalizable our insights are to
settings beyond civic engagement or to other fairness criteria.
The Normative Perspective. In addition to the ethical questions discussed above, our work
raises other normative questions that need to be carefully studied. First, it is not obvious what the
right measure of diversity should be: should an advertiser aim for equitable amounts of budget spent
for different demographics, equitable number of impressions, or equitable number of participants
recruited? These objectives can be in conflict as shown in Section 3.1: optimizing for equitable
proportions would result in a lower absolute number of African American votes. Further, how do
we determine the right granularity for measuring diversity? Not surprisingly, we observe in our
experiments that if we measure diversity separately for the coarse demographics of age and race, we
might actually do worse for gender; we present the result in Appendix B.5.
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Algorithmic Challenges. The model and algorithms in Section 4 do not currently have additional
constraints such as limits on cost per vote, or limiting campaigns to have some nice structure such
as contiguous age groups or geography. Further, since we are optimizing proportions of votes, even
a few days’ worth of mis-allocated budget based on inaccurate parameter settings can significantly
skew the proportions. Can we devise low-regret learning algorithms for the parameters?
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A Details of Experiments
In this section, we present the exact campaigns we created in Durham and Greensboro, and the
rationale for doing so.
In our implementations, we considered three age groups (young, middle, and old), two racial
categories (African American, non-African American), two ethnic categories (Hispanic, non-Hispanic),
and two genders (male, female) as the possible demographics on which we seek balance. In our
experiments, the parallel campaigns differed in the targeted audience and allocated budget. We
considered various campaigns described in our narrative below.
For Durham, the total amount spent was $ 8,617.11 resulting in 727,170 total impressions and a
total of 4920 English language surveys was collected over 31 days (surveys include surveys resulting
from organic participation). For Greensboro, the total amount spent was $ 9,681.56 resulting in
1,015,204 impressions and a total of 3,584 English language surveys was collected (including from
organic participation).
Our campaigns respected some ethical boundaries: We did not use options that shared private
data with third parties, for instance by allowing the advertising platform to track conversion until
the survey (’pixel’) or by creating a lookalike audience based on completed surveys or verification
data. We also did not acquire databases with personal data that are not part of the public record.
A.1 Experiment in Durham NC: Facebook-inferred Targeting
We ran the following sets of parallel campaigns in Durham. For each campaign, we required
that targeted individuals were located within the city (i.e. they were eligible to participate) and 18
years or older (for consent reasons).
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D1 4 campaigns using Facebook-inferred characteristics. A campaign targeting the general
population (General), interest in Hispanic culture and Hispanic Multicultural Affinity (Hisp1),
interest in African-American culture and African-American Multicultural Affinity (AfrAm1)
and the general population excluding everyone with any college experience (Educ).
D2 2 campaigns (Hisp2 and AfrAm2) using Facebook-inferred characteristics, similar to D1 but
only targeting multicultural affinity.
D3 5 campaigns. Besides Hisp1 and AfrAm1, also two custom audiences (HispC and AfrAmC)
created from Hispanic/Latino and African American voter lists and one ’lookalike’ audience
(AfrAmLAL) that Facebook created based on AfrAmC.
We started in Durham naively with the targeting parameters (D1) as they were provided by
Facebook. As described in Section 3.1, we quickly learned that all three targeted campaigns were
quite imprecise with regards to their actual outcome. On the suggestion of a Facebook support
agent, we tried targeting only by multicultural affinity (D2). As described in Appendix B.1, this
was also very ineffective. This led us to create custom audiences using voter lists (D3). Finally, we
added a lookalike audience based on one of the custom audiences, to see if we could use the voter
lists to effectively target people of the same demographics that never voted in an election. These
results for lookalike audiences are described in Section 3.2.
A.2 Experiment in Greensboro NC: Custom Audiences using Voter Lists
We used the following sets of parallel campaigns in Greensboro. As before, for each campaign, we
required that targeted individuals were located within the city (i.e. they were eligible to participate)
and 18 years or older (for consent reasons).
G1 6 campaigns, 5 of which were custom using overlapping subsets of voter lists targeting age
18-44 (YoungC), age 45-65 (MiddleC), age 65+ (OldC), African-American voters (AfrAmC),
all voters except African-American voters (OtherC) and finally a complement targeting all
people in the city except those already matched in G1 (Complement1).
G2 The same as G1, but (AfrAmC) was randomly split into 4 non-overlapping custom audiences
(AfrAmC-1, AfrAmC-2, AfrAmC-3 and AfrAmC-4).
G3 8 campaigns, 5 of which (YoungLAL, MiddleLAL, OldLAL, AfrAmLAL, OtherLAL) were
lookalike audiences based on G1, a lookalike audience based on an audience of all female voters
(FemaleLAL) and all male voters (MaleLAL) and the complement of all other G3 lookalike
audiences (Complement3). Lookalike audiences were created by Facebook with a 5% (age) or
10% (race/gender) target, resulting in a national audience that is then filtered by location
(Greensboro) and age (18+).
G4 6 campaigns, using Facebook-inferred characteristics targeting age 18-44 (YoungF), age 45-
65 (MiddleF), age 65+ (OldF), interest in African-American culture and African-American
multicultural affinity (AfrAmF), female users (FemaleF) and male users (MaleF).
We started with (G1) and included the “complement” campaign targeting the whole city except
those people part of one of the other campaigns, in order not to fully exclude them from the
advertising process. These results are presented in Section 3.2. In order to test a hypothesis that
targeting smaller audiences is more expensive (see Appendix B.3), we continued in (G2) with the
same campaigns, but split one of the audiences randomly into four audiences of equal size.
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In (G3), we explored the effectiveness in targeting by lookalike audiences along different demo-
graphic axes, by creating custom audiences sliced by age (3), race (2) and gender (2) and again one
complement campaign; these results are presented in Appendix B.2. We also further explored the
effectiveness of targeting by Facebook-inferred characteristics in (G4). In (G4), non-African Ameri-
cans could not be targeted because Facebook does not allow to exclude people African American
multicultural affinity from a campaign. Our preliminary analysis indicates that targeting by proxies
for race is as ineffective as in Durham; however, there are too few votes to assess confidence and we
do not report these results.
B Additional Empirical Analysis
We now provide additional empirical results that we allude to in Sections 3, 4, and 5.
B.1 Performance of AfrAm2 Campaign in Durham
In set (D2), when ran one ad targeting African American multicultural affinity. Assuming a
Poisson distribution for African-American votes generated, the ad had an average of 0.002 African
American votes per dollar, with 95% confidence interval [0, 0.013]. The specificity was 0.09, with
a 95% confidence interval of [0, 0.37]. This shows a performance comparable to (AfrAm1), and is
Pareto-dominated on African-American votes per dollar by (General).
B.2 Lookalike Audiences in Greensboro
The “lookalike” campaigns (G3) in Greensboro NC didn’t provide enough votes to analyze their
specificity with surveys. Because Facebook reports detailed statistics for age and gender, we can
evaluate the proportion of the budget, views and clicks that belongs to each demographic. We
observe that while we inform the lookalike campaigns with very different (e.g. all male and all
female) audiences, the spending and view proportions across gender (male) and age (young) are
indistinguishable (see Table 3). This can only be explained if the created audience includes sufficient
people outside the targeted demographic.
We summarize these observations below.
Observation 4. Campaigns created using the “lookalike” feature on Facebook even when seeded with
lists specific to age and gender demographics, result in exposure and actions that are indistinguishable
across those demographics.
Proportion of: Male Young
Targeting Criterion: Female Male Young Middle Old
Custom Audience 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000
Spend 0.544 0.558 0.789 0.781 0.679
Impressions 0.555 0.528 0.822 0.835 0.770
Clicks 0.655 0.589 0.835 0.820 0.607
Table 3: Specificity of complementary Lookalike Campaigns; the voter list demographic that is
used for creating the respective lookalike campaign is listed in the second row. For each campaign,
we find the fraction of spend, impressions, and clicks that Facebook allocates to male and young
audiences.
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(a) Box plots of the daily cost per click for Greens-
boro African American custom campaigns, where
the first and last campaigns are Full campaigns
and the rest are run with a fourth of the voter list
each.
(b) The ratio of the proportion of the budget
allocated to the proportion of the voter list for
that demographic, each with respect to the overall
campaign.
Figure 3: Effect of campaign size (left) and proportionality of budget allocation (right)
B.3 Large versus Small Audience Sizes
We tested whether reducing audience size had an impact on the performance of advertising
campaigns. Towards this end, we split the voter list for African Americans in Greensboro (the
campaign with the highest allocated budget) into four equal parts. We first ran a larger campaign
targeted to the full list of African American voters with a daily budget of around $100. We then
stopped this campaign and ran four smaller campaigns, each with one equal sized split of the voter
list and a daily budget of $25. The results of the experiment are shown in Fig. 3a, and leads to the
following observation.
Observation 5. The smaller split campaigns (with smaller audiences) each has a greater range in
cost per click, a higher maximum cost per click, and higher mean cost per click than the campaigns
with the full voter list (with larger audience).
In order to rule out the effects of ad fatigue and exhaustion of the voter list as the cause, we
again ran the full campaign for another six days. Notice that the full campaign has comparable
performance in both the initial and final time segments, showing that the effect we observe cannot
be explained by ad fatigue.
B.4 Relation of Spend to Proportion of Voter List
We now analyze how Facebook splits budget across sub-demographics within a voter list. As
mentioned before, when an advertiser submits a list of people to Facebook for a campaign audience,
Facebook uses the information in the list to identify corresponding Facebook profiles. The budget
set for the campaign is then spent advertising directly to the list of matched Facebook profiles.
We analyze the Greensboro (AfrAmC) and (OtherC) campaigns described above. For each
campaign, we consider the sub-demographics induced by combinations of age and gender. For
each of these sub-demographics, Facebook shows us the spend per campaign. We calculate the
ratio of the fraction of the spend for that sub-demographic to the fraction of the voter list that
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is of that sub-demographic. In Fig. 3b, we show the actual ratios lie between at least 0.4 and
1.60. This shows that to a reasonable approximation, for each demographic i, we can assume qi is
proportional to the size of the corresponding voter list. Of course, the resulting conversions across
demographics within this list could be highly unequal (see Section 3.2). Our goal is not to argue
that Facebook’s allocation mechanisms are perfectly proportional, but instead to come up with a
reasonable approximation that we can use in our simulation and experiments.
B.5 Outcomes Orthogonal to Targeting Criteria
The custom campaigns in Greensboro did not explicitly target gender and a priori we expect the
gender ratios to be proportional. We show in Table 4 that the resulting votes have a disproportionate
fraction of females, while they make up approximately half of each list. Therefore, if we impose
equity of effort via custom campaigns along the dimensions of race and age, this has the side-effect
of producing inequitable outcomes along the gender dimension. The take-away is that if we seek
parity along a dimension (such as gender), we need to explicitly consider it in our optimization
models and algorithms. This motivates our overall problem of balancing fine grained demographics.
YoungC AfrAmC MediumC OldC OtherC
Fraction of Votes 0.49 0.74 0.75 0.83 0.86
Fraction of List 0.59 0.61 0.54 0.58 0.55
Table 4: Fraction of female votes to overall votes for Greensboro 2019 Custom Audience Campaigns.
C Algorithms for Other Objective Functions
C.1 Algorithm for Monotone Functions
We first consider the case of monotone functions, where the objective can be written as
Minimize
∑
i∈D
f
(
Yσ(i)
βi
)
subject to Constraint (4). Here, f is an arbitrary monotonically non-decreasing function with
f(0) = 0, and f(ρ) = 1 for ρ ≥ 1.
Let OPT denote the optimal objective value, as well as the optimal solution. The first thing
to note is that Claim 1 need not hold: A demographic i ∈ D can now potentially be assigned to
campaign j with Yj much smaller than βi. This complicates the design of the dynamic program.
We now show the following theorem:
Theorem 3. A solution of objective value at least OPT/2 can be computed in time O(kn5).
In order to prove the theorem, we first discuss the structure of OPT . Given any solution with
Y1 ≤ Y2 ≤ · · · ≤ Yk, suppose i ∈ D satisfies Yj ≤ βi ≤ Yj+1. Then this i is assigned in one of three
possible ways:
1. It is not assigned to any campaign, so that σ(i) = 0; or
2. It is assigned to campaign j′ > j, contributes 1 to the objective, and has expected number of
conversions wiYj′ . In this case, we can assume j
′ = j + 1 since it reduces the expected number
of conversions while preserving the objective; or
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3. It is assigned to campaign j′ ≤ j, so that it contributes f
(
Yj′
βi
)
to the objective, and has
expected number of conversions wiYj′ ≤ wiβi.
Note now that at least half the objective is contributed by Cases (1) and (2), or by Cases (1)
and (3). We therefore solve for the best solution where each demographic is constrained to be
assigned as in Cases (1) and (2), and we then solve for the best solution where each demographic is
constrained to be assigned as in Cases (1) and (3). We then take the better of the two solutions.
This will yield a 2-approximation to OPT , proving Theorem 3.
Optimal Solution for Case (2). We first consider the case where each demographic i is either
assigned to the smallest j such that Yj ≥ βi or to campaign 0. However, this case is exactly the
same as the formulation in Section 4.3 when γ = 1. By Theorem 2, the optimal solution for this
case can be computed in O(kn5) time.
Optimal Solution for Case (3). In this case, note that since each demographic i ∈ D is assigned
to a campaign σ(i) = j with Yj ≤ β, the expected number of conversions is∑
i∈D
wiYσ(i) ≤
∑
i∈D
wiβi =
∑
i∈D
αi = 1
Therefore, Constraint (4) is satisfied regardless of how i ∈ D is assigned. In order to maximize
the objective, each i ∈ D should therefore be assigned to the largest Yj such that Yj ≤ βi.
We can find this solution by a simple dynamic program. Let Wj(i) denote the best set of j
campaigns, where Yj = βi. The final goal is find maxiWk(i). For j > 1, we have the recurrence:
Wj(i) = max
1≤`≤i
Wj−1(`) +
i−1∑
q=`
f(β`/βq)

which corresponds to assigning all demographics q with ` ≤ q < i to Yj−1 = β`, and taking the best
possibility. The running time of this dynamic program is O(kn2).
Taking the better of the solutions to the two dynamic programs yields value at least OPT/2
while preserving Constraint (4), completing the proof of Theorem 3.
C.2 Minimizing Total Variation Distance
In this section, we treat demographic fractions {αi} and the vote fractions {ρα} as distributions
and minimize the variation distance between them. Recall that
∑
i∈D αi = 1, and that f(ρi) =
−αi‖1− ρi‖, so that Objective (2) becomes:
Minimize
∑
i∈D
αi‖1− ρi‖
As mentioned before, such a global approach may ignore small demographics if there are not too
many of them, which has the advantage of potentially reducing the cost per vote. It also leads to a
more efficient dynamic program compared to the ones presented in Sections 4.3 and C.1.
Formally, let Y0 = 0 and S0 be the corresponding demographics not assigned to any campaign.
Recall that the fraction of conversions for demographic i can be written as wiYσ(i) if i ∈ Sj . Similarly,
αi = wiβi. The variation distance objective function is therefore:
Minimize
∑
i∈D
wi
∣∣Yσ(i) − βi∣∣
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subject to the constraint that the expected number of conversions is 1, that is, Constraint (3). In
this setting, it is not clear how to replace Constraint (3) by Constraint (4). We now show the
following theorem; the non-trivial part of the proof is satisfying Constraint (3).
Theorem 4. A solution with TVD at most 2OPT and that uses at most k + 1 campaigns can be
computed in O(kn) time.
Weighted k-Median Relaxation. Suppose we consider the relaxed problem where we ignore
Constraint (3). Clearly, the objective value does not increase when we remove a constraint. This
relaxation is exactly the weighted k-median problem on a line, where the point i is located at βi, its
weight is wi, and the centers are located at {Yj}, with an extra (k + 1)st center fixed at 0. This has
a O(kn) time exact algorithm [20]. The resulting solution yields the {Yj} as well as the associated
sets Sj . Given this optimal solution 0 = Y0 ≤ Y1 ≤ · · · ≤ Yk, each i ∈ D with Yj ≤ βi ≤ Yj+1 is
assigned to the closest Y , which means it is assigned either to Yj or to Yj+1.
Given a solution to this relaxation (which has objective at most OPT ), we show that Con-
straint (3) can be satisfied by increasing the objective by a factor of 2. Suppose the relaxed optimum
has 0 = Y0 ≤ Y1 ≤ Y2 ≤ · · · ≤ Yk. Let Sj denote the set of demographics assigned to campaign j;
note that each i ∈ Sj is closer to Yj than to any other Yj′ . For j ≥ 0, we modify Yj as follows: Let
Y˜j =
y
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈Sj ,βi≤y
wi(y − βi) =
∑
i∈Sj ,βi≥y
wi(βi − y)
 (5)
The key lemma below shows that the modification satisfies Constraint (3) and increases the
objective by a factor of 2. Since the above process may make Y˜0 > 0, this results in an extra
campaign in the solution, so it will have k+ 1 campaigns. This will complete the proof of Theorem 4.
Lemma 5. The modified solution Y˜1 ≤ · · · ≤ Y˜k with sets Sj for campaign j satisfies:
1. The TVD satisfies:
∑k
j=0
∑
i∈Sj wi
∥∥∥Y˜j − βi∥∥∥ ≤ 2OPT ; and
2. The expected number of conversions satisfies:
∑k
j=0
∑
i∈Sj wiY˜j = 1.
Proof. Given the {Yj} and sets Sj , the contribution of campaign j to the original relaxed objective
is
∑
i∈Sj |Yj − βi|, and to the modified solution is
∑
i∈Sj |Y˜j − βi|.
Suppose Y˜j ≤ Yj ; the other case is symmetric. Let Aj = {i ∈ Sj , βi ≤ Y˜j}. Then,∑
i∈Sj
|Y˜j − βi| = 2
∑
i∈Aj
(
Y˜j − βi
)
≤ 2
∑
i∈Aj
(Yj − βi) ≤ 2
∑
i∈Sj
|Yj − βi|
Here, the first equality follows from Eq (5); the first inequality follows since Y˜j ≤ Yj , and the final
inequality follows since Aj ⊂ Sj . Summing over j = 0, 1, . . . , k proves the first part of the lemma.
Note now that
∑
i∈D wiβi =
∑
i∈D αi = 1. For each j ≥ 0, Equation (5) implies that∑
i∈Sj wiY˜j =
∑
i∈Sj wiβi. Summing over all j proves the second part of the lemma.
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